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Security guide · Updated

Was it a DNS attack or an outage? How to tell, and what the November 16 bank outages showed

A DNS attack sends people to the wrong place or nowhere by breaking or taking over the internet’s address lookups. An ordinary outage happens inside a company’s own systems. They can look the same from a phone, but they leave different evidence, and anyone can check it. For the November 16, 2026 bank outages, Chase blamed a software bug in its own on-premise systems and said transactions were posting normally by that evening. Our checks of seven bank domains found no sign of DNS tampering.

By George Shvaya, founder of Webvello · Published

Key takeaways

  • On Monday, November 16, 2026, Downdetector showed thousands of problem reports for Chase, plus Bank of America, U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo, Zelle and others.
  • Chase later said it had “a temporary issue related to a software bug in on-premise hardware systems,” that it was not “cyber-related,” and that other banks were slowed only where they were party to a transaction with Chase.
  • Around 6:30 p.m. ET Chase said: “Transactions are now posting normally.”
  • U.S. Bank, PNC, Truist and Capital One said they were not directly affected; U.S. Bank said Zelle payments with other institutions could be delayed. Zelle said: “Zelle is not down.”
  • Our checks at about 5 p.m. ET: every address public resolvers returned for seven bank and payment domains belonged to the bank’s usual hosting network, and the bank sites served their usual DigiCert certificates.
  • A real DNS attack leaves outside evidence: changed name server records, wrong answers from public resolvers, and unexpected certificates in public Certificate Transparency logs.
  • Large DNS attacks have happened (Dyn in 2016, the Sea Turtle hijacking campaign in 2017 to 2019), and so have DNS failures with no attacker at all (AWS in October 2025).

What happened on November 16, 2026?

Customers of several large U.S. banks reported trouble logging in, seeing balances and moving money, mostly at Chase. This is the record through Monday evening.
Reported problems and statements, Monday, November 16, 2026 (from news reports, times Eastern)
InstitutionWhat was reportedWhat it said
Chase (JPMorgan Chase)More than 4,600 Downdetector reports at 1:50 p.m., nearly 4,800 at 2 p.m., the most of any bank. NBC reported problems with both online and in-person branch transactions.“Due to a technical issue, some transactions are taking longer than usual to complete” and “customers still have access to their accounts and funds.” Later: “a temporary issue related to a software bug in on-premise hardware systems,” not “cyber-related,” and “other banks may have been impacted by slowness in transactions only to the extent that they were a party to a transaction with us.” Around 6:30 p.m.: “Transactions are now posting normally.” App notice: “Some services aren’t available. We’re working on them. Please try back later.”
Bank of AmericaMore than 1,900 reports at 1:50 p.m.No public statement as of 2:16 p.m.
U.S. BankMore than 900 reports at 1:50 p.m.“U.S. Bank systems are not directly impacted. However, clients attempting to send or receive Zelle payments with another financial institution may experience transaction delays.”
Wells FargoAbout 800 reports at 1:50 p.m.Website said online banking was temporarily unavailable and accounts could still be reached through ATMs, branches and customer service.
ZelleSpike in reports“Zelle is not down. Zelle is operating as it should.” It noted that customers’ funds are held by their banks.
TruistSpike in reportsServices “are operating normally”
Capital OneSpike in reports“has not been impacted and continues to operate normally at this time”
PNCNot reported“not experiencing any direct impact”

Sources: CBS News (updated 2:30 p.m. ET), Yahoo Finance / 24/7 Wall St. (2:17 p.m. ET), Boston 25 News (2:57 p.m. ET), NBC News, Fox Business, FOX 35 (updated 8:15 p.m. ET) and 6abc. Downdetector counts are complaints, not affected customers, and they rise and fall through the day.

The outages followed a Microsoft outage that began the previous Friday and affected Outlook, Teams and Copilot. Microsoft said a technical issue caused it and that it was not linked to a cyberattack. No bank had connected Monday’s problems to it, and NBC reported no evidence the incidents were connected. Fox Business quoted a teller at one Washington, D.C. branch saying in-branch and online problems began around 10 a.m. and were resolved “just after 3 p.m.” and that ATMs worked normally. By 8 p.m. ET, FOX 35 counted about 600 Downdetector reports for Chase, 380 for Bank of America and fewer than 200 for Wells Fargo. A person familiar with the situation told NBC that regulators were in touch with the banks immediately and found the problem contained; no regulator commented on the record. Bank of America and Wells Fargo did not give a statement, and Citibank declined to comment. We will update this page if Chase publishes a fuller explanation.

Update, November 17: a separate data-theft claim, and what Visa said. On November 16 an extortion group calling itself n0n added JPMorgan Chase, Visa, Mastercard, Walmart and other companies to its leak site, claiming to have stolen customer and marketing records (Secritic). Those are the group’s own claims and are unverified; by its own descriptions they do not include card numbers, security codes or online banking passwords. Visa then told Cybernews that a security incident had occurred at a third-party service provider, that Visa’s own systems were not involved or affected, and that there was no sign payment data such as card numbers was compromised. Visa did not name the provider. Chase still attributes Monday’s outage to a software bug with no evidence of a cyberattack, and no report we reviewed links the n0n claim to the outage. Neither involves DNS. If you hold a Visa card, the steps in what to do now still apply: watch statements and be wary of messages that mention this news.

What would a DNS attack on the banks have left behind?

DNS runs in public. An attack on it changes things that independent people can see without the banks’ help.
Evidence of a DNS attack, where anyone can check it, and what we found on November 16, 2026 (4:53 to 5:00 p.m. ET)
EvidenceWhere it shows upWhat we found
The domain’s name server or DNS records suddenly changePublic DNS lookups and historical DNS data servicesEach domain pointed to name servers run by the bank itself or its long-standing DNS providers. Nothing unexpected.
Public resolvers (Google 8.8.8.8, Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9) return addresses the bank does not ownAnyone running a lookup, plus network operators who monitor resolutionAll 40 addresses returned by Cloudflare, Google, Quad9 and OpenDNS belonged to Akamai, Amazon or Cloudflare, the hosting networks these banks use.
A new certificate for the bank’s domain from an unexpected issuerPublic Certificate Transparency logs, searchable with tools such as crt.shNone. The sites served valid DigiCert certificates issued months earlier, and crt.sh listed no new ones for chase.com, bankofamerica.com or usbank.com.
Customers land on look-alike login pagesPhishing reports, browser security warnings, researcher write-upsNone reported in the coverage we reviewed
Many unrelated sites fail at once because they share a DNS providerOutage trackers across many unrelated brandsNo. Reports were concentrated on banks and payments.

These are snapshots from one location late in the day, so they are evidence against a DNS attack, not proof that none ever happened. They line up with what Chase described. The symptoms, slow transfers, failed logins and branch systems going up and down, sit behind the address lookup: the Chase app was reaching Chase well enough to show Chase’s own notice. The full results are in the next section.

We checked the bank domains ourselves. What did we find?

On November 16, 2026, from 4:53 to 5:00 p.m. ET, we looked up seven bank and payment domains through four public resolvers and checked their registry status and certificates.
Public DNS, registry and certificate checks by Webvello, November 16, 2026, 4:53 to 5:00 p.m. ET
DomainDNS hosted byResolver answers belonged toDNSSECRegistry-level lock statusesCertificate served
chase.comJPMorgan’s own name servers, plus Cloudflare secondaryAkamaiNot signedYesValid, DigiCert EV, issued Dec 2025
bankofamerica.comBank of America’s own name serversAkamaiSignedYesValid, DigiCert EV, issued Jul 2026
wellsfargo.comAkamai and UltraDNSAkamaiNot signedYesValid, DigiCert EV, issued Aug 2026
usbank.comU.S. Bank’s own name serversAkamaiNot signedYesValid, DigiCert, issued Feb 2026
zellepay.comAmazon Route 53CloudflareSignedYesValid, DigiCert EV, issued Jun 2026
truist.comAkamaiAmazonNot signedYesNot checked
capitalone.comAkamai and Capital One’s own name serversAkamaiNot signedNot shownNot checked
  • Different resolvers returned different addresses for the same site. That is normal: content networks such as Akamai answer with servers near the person asking. What matters is who owns the addresses, and every one of the 40 belonged to the bank’s hosting network.
  • Registry-level lock statuses (serverUpdateProhibited and related codes in public WHOIS) mean the .com registry itself blocks changes to the domain’s name servers unless the owner goes through an extra check. Six of the seven domains showed them. They are one protection among several, not a security grade.
  • DNSSEC lets resolvers detect forged DNS answers. Two of the seven domains were signed. Unsigned domains are common among large companies and are not a sign of compromise.
  • crt.sh listed no certificates issued after October 19 for chase.com, October 16 for usbank.com or September 14 for bankofamerica.com. crt.sh can lag behind the logs, and its Wells Fargo search failed, so treat this as a snapshot.

How can you check a bank’s DNS yourself?

Four free checks, run from a Mac or Linux terminal. Each takes seconds and none needs an account.
  1. 1

    See who answers for the domain

    Run dig +short NS chase.com. The name servers should belong to the bank or its known DNS provider, and should not change from one day to the next.
  2. 2

    Ask several resolvers for the address

    Run dig +short www.chase.com @1.1.1.1, then repeat with @8.8.8.8 and @9.9.9.9. Different addresses are fine. Look up who owns them with a whois or IP lookup tool; they should belong to the bank or its content network.
  3. 3

    Check the certificate the site is serving

    Run openssl s_client -connect www.chase.com:443 -servername www.chase.com and look for “Verify return code: 0 (ok)” and the issuer. Your browser’s padlock shows the same details.
  4. 4

    Search the certificate logs

    Search the domain on crt.sh or another Certificate Transparency monitor. A brand-new certificate from an issuer the bank never uses is the warning sign.

Should you just trust what the banks say?

No. Treat a bank statement as a claim, and check it against evidence the bank does not control.
  • Companies do have reasons to play down security incidents, and some have disclosed breaches late.
  • Public companies also face rules that make a false “just a bug” story costly. Since 2023 the SEC has required them to disclose a material cybersecurity incident on Form 8-K, generally within four business days of deciding it is material (SEC adopting release).
  • DNS evidence is the part a bank cannot hide: records, resolver answers and certificate logs are public and watched by people who do not work for the banks.
  • So the useful question is not whether you believe the bank. It is whether the outside evidence has appeared. If it does, the picture changes at once.

What is a “core” DNS attack, in plain language?

DNS is the internet’s phone book. A DNS attack breaks the phone book, or rewrites the entry for one name.

When you type chase.com, your phone asks a DNS resolver for the server address behind that name, then connects to it. An attacker can try to stop that lookup from working, or make it return an address the attacker controls. Each kind has happened before.

Kinds of DNS attack and failure, with real examples
KindWhat it doesReal example
Flooding a DNS providerOverloads the servers that answer for many domains, so lookups failDyn, October 21, 2016: Dyn said the Mirai botnet of infected internet-connected devices was a primary source of the attack, which disrupted many major sites in waves (Help Net Security)
Hijacking the recordsTakes over a registrar or DNS account and points a domain somewhere elseSea Turtle: Cisco Talos found “at least 40 different organizations across 13 different countries” compromised in a campaign that likely began in January 2017 (Talos). In January 2019 CISA ordered U.S. federal agencies to audit their DNS records and add multi-factor login to DNS accounts (Emergency Directive 19-01, since closed)
Poisoning a resolver’s cacheTricks a resolver into storing a false answer it then hands to its usersThe 2008 cache poisoning flaw: CERT/CC said “deficiencies in the DNS protocol and common DNS implementations facilitate DNS cache poisoning attacks” (VU#800113)
No attacker at allA defect in a company’s own DNS automation breaks its lookupsAWS, October 19 to 20, 2025: a “latent race condition” in DynamoDB’s DNS management system left “an incorrect empty DNS record” for its regional endpoint (AWS summary)

What would a foreign DNS attack on the United States look like?

It would be one of the attacks above, run at national scale by a foreign government or group.

What people would notice

Many unrelated apps and sites, such as banks, email, shopping and government services, failing together or loading pages that are not what they seem, across different internet providers at the same time.

Why it is hard to do

The top of DNS is 13 root server identities, each served from many sites around the world through anycast, run by independent operators (root-servers.org). Big providers and banks also run their own DNS across several locations. Knocking out the core needs far more than hitting one server.

Why it would not stay secret

Network operators, researchers and other countries watch DNS constantly. Wrong answers and new certificates show up in public data within minutes to hours, long before an official statement.

The more likely version

Past state-linked campaigns such as Sea Turtle targeted specific organizations by stealing registrar or DNS account access, rather than breaking the whole system. That is why account security on DNS matters so much.

What should you do during a bank outage?

Assume the outage is real and the scam messages about it are coming. Protect yourself without panicking.
  1. 1

    Check your accounts the safe way

    Open the bank’s official app, or type the bank’s address yourself. Do not use links in texts or emails. Look for transactions you did not make.
  2. 2

    Treat every outage message as a possible scam

    Messages saying your account is locked and you must click, call or verify now are the classic outage scam. Use the number on the back of your card instead.
  3. 3

    Change a password only for a reason

    Change it if you see activity you did not make, entered your login on a suspicious page, or get a real notice from the bank. Rushed mass changes lead to weak, reused passwords.
  4. 4

    Use stronger sign-in

    Turn on two-step sign-in for every financial account, using an authenticator app or security key where offered instead of text messages.
  5. 5

    Turn on transaction alerts

    Push, text or email alerts for every payment let you spot a problem the moment it happens.
  6. 6

    Keep a backup way to pay

    Some cash or a card from a different bank covers you if your main bank stays down for a day.
  7. 7

    Freeze your credit if you want extra protection

    A credit freeze stops new accounts being opened in your name. The FTC says it is free to place and lift, and you request it from Equifax, Experian and TransUnion separately (FTC guide).

How do you protect your own domain from DNS hijacking?

Most DNS hijacks start with a stolen registrar or DNS login, not with breaking DNS itself.
  • Put strong multi-factor sign-in on your registrar and DNS host accounts. CISA’s 2019 directive recommended phishing-resistant factors and advised against text-message codes (ED 19-01).
  • Ask your registrar for registry lock, which Talos recommends because it requires an out-of-band check before records can change (Talos).
  • Audit your DNS records against what you expect, and remove records for services you no longer use.
  • Watch Certificate Transparency logs for certificates issued for your domain that you did not request (CT monitors).
  • Turn on DNSSEC where your registrar and DNS host support it. ICANN describes it as protecting users from “getting bad data from a signed zone” (ICANN).
  • Know who can change your DNS, and keep that list short.
  • See how the 100 largest U.S. banks score on these same settings in our bank DNS security study: 30% have a registry lock and 26% use DNSSEC.

If you build with AI tools, the same habit applies to the rest of your stack: limit who and what can change production. Our AI security hub covers that for AI apps, agents and code.

Who can change your DNS today?

Tell us your registrar and DNS host. We will check sign-in protection, record hygiene and certificate monitoring.

Pages that go deeper on the pieces this one touches.

Common questions

Straight answers to what owners ask us first.

Was the November 16, 2026 bank outage a DNS attack?

There is no public evidence that it was. Chase said the cause was a software bug in its on-premise hardware systems, that it was not cyber-related, and that transactions were posting normally again by about 6:30 p.m. ET. Our own checks at about 5 p.m. ET found the bank domains pointing to their usual name servers and hosting networks and serving their usual certificates.

Did Visa have a data breach on November 16, 2026?

Visa told Cybernews on November 17 that a security incident occurred at a third-party service provider, that its own systems were not involved or affected, and that there was no sign card numbers or other payment data were compromised. An extortion group called n0n claims to have stolen customer and marketing data from Visa, Mastercard and JPMorgan Chase; those claims are unverified, and no report has linked them to the November 16 bank outage.

Was my money or password stolen in the outage?

An outage on its own does not steal money or passwords. Theft needs a further step, such as you entering your login on a fake page. Check your accounts in the official app, and change your password if you see activity you did not make or entered it somewhere suspicious.

How can I tell if a website’s DNS has been hijacked?

Signs include a browser certificate warning on a site that normally loads cleanly, a login page that looks slightly off, and a domain that resolves to a different address than usual. Site owners can check their records directly and search Certificate Transparency logs for certificates they did not request.

Could a foreign country take down DNS in the United States?

Attacks on DNS providers and on individual organizations’ DNS accounts have happened, including campaigns that crossed many countries. Taking down DNS nationwide is much harder because the root and major providers run from many locations at once, and it would be visible to network operators almost immediately.

Does DNSSEC stop DNS attacks?

It stops one kind: forged answers from a signed zone. It does not stop an attacker who logs into your DNS account and changes the records legitimately, and it does not stop a flood of traffic. That is why account security and monitoring matter as much as DNSSEC.

Why did my bank have problems if only Chase had a bug?

Chase said other banks were slowed only where they were party to a transaction with Chase, such as a Zelle payment to or from a Chase account. U.S. Bank said the same about Zelle payments with other institutions, and Truist, Capital One and PNC said they were not directly affected. Bank of America and Wells Fargo did not give a statement.

Will this page be updated?

Yes. When Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank or a regulator publishes a cause, we will add it to the incident section with the date and source.

Check your own domain’s defenses

We review how your domain, DNS and site are protected, and what to fix first.